It is clear that both nations have too many overlapping interests to tackle in the coming decades. They realize that the time for confrontational Cold War politics is now over. According to President Obama, America believes in a Russia that is “strong, peaceful and prosperous”.
The two sides agreed to greater cooperation on Afghanistan, where Obama is bolstering US troop strength in the fight against Taliban and Al-Qaida. Part of the deal will allow the US to fly, without transit charges, American troops, weapons and other lethal war equipment across Russian territory. Such US overflights had been limited to non-lethal supplies for the US-led NATO forces in Afghanistan, a country from which Russia withdrew in defeat 20 years ago after a decade-long occupation. The current route for crucial war materials required by US and NATO forces runs through Pakistan and road convoys have been repeatedly targeted by the militants.
Obama's top adviser on Russian affairs, Michael McFaul, said there was no past US-Soviet summit where the two sides had dealt with so many matters of substance. However, outside the hotel in Moscow, where Obama met with opposition leaders, a young man held up a sign that said: "Everything changes. The KGB remains the same." The sign was ripped from his hands by police and he slipped away. Putin is a former KGB officer, as are many of the officials serving in his government.
The summit was packed with animated passions in the run-up and loaded with history. But, ultimately, what matters is the morning after. The Russian side seems to have left it almost completely in the able hands of the White House to whip up hype that the summit was a resounding success. On their part, the Russians remained reticent - they almost lapsed into a native philosophical quietude.
A part of the reason for the mystique of the Moscow summit was the engrossing persona of Obama and the seductive charm of his gait and words. Obama has no previous "Russia connection" except for his love, like any intelligent African-American would conceivably have, for Alexander Pushkin, which likely inspired him to name his second daughter Natasha in honour of the poet's wife Natalya Goncharova (Natasha is usually the Russian diminutive of Natalya). Besides, Pushkin too had African roots traceable to his grandfather from Ethiopia. But in the unforgiving world of big-power politics, human bondage is hardly anything to go by.
The intriguing question, therefore, remained unanswered right till the eve of the US president's arrival in Moscow. As Izvestia noted: "Barack Obama remains a mysterious character ... Is he a true democrat and a man of his word, or just a glib talker? He has promised many things, in particular, to reset relations with Russia ... In US political culture, you can become president if you have a talent for talking. Bill Clinton always used the same trick to manipulate Boris Yeltsin: he nodded at everything the Russian president said and assured him of his friendship while never budging an inch from his stand. His team says Yeltsin did everything that Clinton wanted."
The Russian angst was palpable. Three things combined. One, Obama has assembled a foreign-policy team to handle Russia, which includes McFaul, well known for his "hard line" towards Russia. Stephen Cohen of New York University recently said, "The major stumbling block is the 'old thinking' ... The notion that Russia is a defeated power, it's not a legitimate great power with equal rights to the US, that Russia should make concessions while the US doesn't have to, that the US can go back on its promises because Russia is imperialistic and evil ... There is enormous support in the US for the old thinking. It's the majority view."
Two, as Izvestia noted, Obama's words, cliches and good manners are just fine, but, "The US administration must do something to show that it has really changed its stand. So far, not a single drop has been poured from the 'carafe of promises' into the glass of 'resetting' relations."
Three, does the reset itself, therefore, signify a change of policy or is it a mere change of rhetoric? Russian-American relations have plunged to their lowest point in a quarter of a century. The good part is that there are signs of the Obama administration doing some rethinking about the US's role in the contemporary world. But the difficult part is that US-Russia relations cannot conceivably begin from a clean slate. Simply put, far too much has happened - US-sponsored "color revolutions" in Tbilisi and Kiev, continued expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into the territories of the former Soviet republics, unrelenting contest for influence in Eurasia, US plans to deploy a missile defence system in Central Europe, conflict in the Caucasus, and so on.
Such bitter political legacy apart, the mode of Russian foreign policy too has shifted to a "proactive type" in comparison with the "reactive type" of policy, as was the case when NATO dismembered Yugoslavia or the US occupied Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. Equally, Russia, like the rest of the world, is conscious that the US's "unipolar moment" has ended and that Obama too probably realizes the futility of any attempt to preserve the colossal inertia of "unipolarity" in political or psychological terms. Thus, the summit in Moscow provided an extraordinary pageantry to outline or to give greater definition to the promised reset in US-Russian relations.
The consensus opinion in both the American and Russian camps was that the summit wouldn't produce any dramatic breakthrough. The old Russia hand, Strobe Talbott, who has been a witness, participant or protagonist in Russian-American co-existence through the past four decades, was prescient when he told Vremya Novostei, "This summit is unlikely to be a failure. Neither do I expect it to fail to provide a new impetus ... As for the reset button, I'm convinced that it should be pushed by both parties."
Russian journalist Dmitri Siderov was not sure whether there would be a major new US-Russian agreement by year's end. The Washington bureau chief of Kommersant, a business and political daily in Moscow, he questioned whether there would be a genuine follow-through. “I don't see how it will reset US-Russian relations,” Siderov said, referring to the Obama administration's stated goal of doing just that.
Siderov suggested that the Moscow summit was primarily an exercise in public relations whose value was mainly cosmetic. In his opinion, the most noteworthy development during the summit was the announcement that Moscow would permit the transit of US soldiers and weapons through Russian airspace to support the war in Afghanistan. But he cautioned that perhaps Washington would be wise to develop an alternate plan in the event the Kremlin reverses its decision.
To be sure, there were no momentous results. But something seems to have changed on two tracks, which might provide an impetus to the relationship. The first steps have been taken towards a new strategic arms limitation treaty. They are small steps and they are not very confident ones, but the fact is they have been taken. The second track is the agreement on Afghanistan. This as such does not change the character of the US-Russia relationship nor should its impact on the trajectory of the Afghan war be exaggerated. But it is highly symbolic.